The optimal weights on indicators in models with partial information about the state of the economy and forward-looking variables are derived and interpreted, both for equilibria under discretion and under commitment. The private sector is assumed to have information about the state of the economy that the policymaker does not possess. Certainty-equivalence is shown to apply, but the separation principle does not hold, since the estimation of the state of the economy is not independent of optimization. We discuss an application to the problem of the optimal use of "real-time" data in the conduct of monetary policy.
Introduction
Monetary policy is inevitably conducted under considerable uncertainty about the state of the economy and the nature of recent disturbances, and analyses of optimal policy that take no account of this are therefore of doubtful practical utility. However, in the case of purely backwardlooking models of the kind exclusively used by central banks prior to the 1990s, powerful general principles for efficient estimation of the state of the economy and for determining the optimal use to make of such estimates have been well-understood since at least the 1970s. In the case of a linear economic model, a quadratic loss function for the policymaker, and uncertainty only about the state of the economy (that is, the current values of certain additive terms in the economic model), a principle of certainty equivalence applies: the optimal policy is the same as if the state were fully observable, except that one responds to an efficient estimate of the state vector rather than to its actual value. Furthermore, a separation principle applies, according to which the determination of the optimal response coefficients to be applied to one's estimate of the state of the economy (the optimization problem) and the estimation of the current state of the economy (the estimation or signal-extraction problem) can be treated as separate problems.
The optimal response coefficients are independent of the specification of the central bank's incomplete information; and the optimal weights to place on alternative indicators in estimating the state vector are independent of the central bank's objective function. 1 This paper contributes to a program (initiated in Svensson and Woodford [12] ) that seeks to determine the extent to which similar methods may be applied in the context of the sort of forward-looking models that are now widely used by central banks in policy simulations.
Forward-looking models -that is, models in which the state of the economy is determined, among other factors, by expectations regarding the economy's future state -raise non-trivial complications not contemplated in the standard treatments of the 1970s. In [12] , we consider a general class of linear-quadratic models, in which the private sector and the central bank are assumed to have the same partial information about the state of the economy. In this special case, we are able to establish that both certainty equivalence and a separation principle still obtain, when properly interpreted. We furthermore exhibit useful general formulas for computation of the optimal policy response coefficients and efficient estimates of the state of the economy in the context of a forward-looking (rational-expectations) model.
In the present paper, we instead consider the additional complications that arise in the case of a particular type of asymmetry between the information available to the central bank and that available to the private sector. The general problem of optimal policy in the case of asymmetric information appears to be quite difficult, so we here restrict our analysis to a particular, relatively simple case, that is nonetheless of considerable interest. 2 This is the case in which the private sector has complete information about the current state of the economy, while the central bank observes only a particular set of indicators, which are also contaminated by "noise" that is unrelated to the fundamental determinants of the state variables that matter for its optimization problem.
One may or may not believe that central banks typically possess less information about the state of the economy than does the private sector. However, there is at least one important argument for the appeal of this assumption. This is that it is the only case in which it is intellectually coherent to assume a common information set for all members of the private sector, so that the model's equations can be expressed in terms of aggregative equations that refer to only a single "private sector information set," while at the same time these model equations are treated as structural, and hence invariant under the alternative policies that are considered in the central bank's optimization problem. It does not make sense that any state variables should matter for the determination of economically relevant quantities (that is, relevant to the central bank's objectives), if they are not known to anyone in the private sector. But if all private agents are to have a common information set, they must then have full information about the relevant state variables. 3 It does not follow from this reasoning, of course, that it is more accurate to assume that all private agents have superior information to that of the central bank; it follows only that this case is one in which the complications resulting from partial information are especially tractable. The development of methods for characterizing optimal policy when different private agents have different information sets remains an important topic for further research. 4 In this paper, we characterize both (Markov-perfect) equilibria in which the central bank optimizes under discretion and the optimal policy under commitment, giving particular attention 2 Examples of recent applications of the kind of general analysis offered here to particular problems include Aoki [1] , [2] and Dotsey and Hornstein [4] . The appendix to [4] independently derives some of the results presented in section 2 below for the case of discretionary policy, building upon the analysis in Svensson and Woodford [12] as we do. Here we also treat the more difficult case of optimal policy under commitment. 3 The kind of optimal policy problem treated in [12] is therefore not one for which rigorous microfoundations can be supplied. Relations such as the Lucas [7] aggregate supply equation, which appear to be of the form considered in that paper, are actually not fully structural; for they involve coefficients that are not invariant to changes in the policy regime, as Lucas stresses. 4 Important early studies that develop methods for characterizing rational expectations equilibria in which different private agents have different information sets include Townsend [14] Pearlman [9] , and Sargent [10] .
to the optimal filtering problem of the central bank in each case. Our main results are parallel in both cases. We establish a certainty-equivalence principle once again: optimal instrument settings satisfy a feedback rule in which the coefficients (describing optimal central-bank responses to the bank's estimates of the state of the economy) are independent of the nature of the bank's partial information (though the estimates that the bank responds to depend upon this). On the other hand, we cannot obtain a separation principle of the sort obtained in the full information case, or in the case of symmetric partial information treated in [12] . The central bank's optimal estimates of the unobserved state variables (used as inputs to the feedback rules just described) are in general not independent of the objective function that it seeks to minimize.
Furthermore, the complete equilibrium evolution of the state of the economy, given the path of the central bank's estimates, can no longer be derived independently of the specification of the bank's partial information and hence of the filter that it uses to derive its estimates. In this respect, asymmetric information results in complexities that do not arise in the case of symmetric partial information.
In section 2, we set out the class of linear-quadratic models with which we are concerned, and then consider optimization under discretion. Section 3 presents corresponding results for the case of optimal policy with commitment. Finally, section 4 illustrates how our framework applies to the optimal policy problem considered by Aoki [1] and [2] .
Optimization under discretion
We begin with an exposition of the general linear-quadratic framework that we assume throughout this paper, and then characterize optimizing policy under discretion.
The framework
We consider a linear model of an economy, in which a vector of state variables are determined by a system of structural equations intended to represent the conditions for rational-expectations equilibrium given optimizing private-sector behavior. We do not explicitly describe the optimization problems of private agents that underlie these equations, but we note that such optimization results in the presence of forward-looking terms (that is, conditional expectations) in the structural equations, and we take care to specify the common information set of all agents in the private sector, with respect to which these conditional expectations are defined. The optimization problem of the central bank (or more generally, the policymaker) is instead described explicitly; in this problem the structural equations resulting from private-sector optimization appear as constraints. We also take care to specify the information set of the central bank, which differs from that of the private sector.
The structural equations are given by a system of the form iid shocks with mean zero and covariance matrix Σ uu , and A, B andẼ are matrices of appropriate dimension. 5 The n x ×n x matrixẼ (which should not be confused with the expectations operator E[·]) may be singular (this is a slight generalization of common formulations in whichẼ is the identity matrix).
We let E t z τ denote the rational expectation (the best estimate) of any variable z τ in period τ , given private-sector information in period t. We will assume that the private-sector has full
We let z τ |t denote the rational expectation (the best estimate) of z τ given the central-bank information in period t. We let I t denote central-bank
. The information is further specified below.
We let Y t denote a vector of n Y target variables given by
where C and C i are matrices of appropriate dimension. We then let the quadratic form
be the central bank's period loss function, where W is a positive-semidefinite weighting matrix.
Let the vector of n Z observable variables, Z t , be given by
4)
5 In [12] , we also allow the structural equations (2.1) that determine Xt and xt to also include general linear terms involving the estimates X t|t and x t|t of the state of the economy based on partial information (of a kind specified below). However, the presence of such terms makes less sense when (as here) we assume that only the central bank has partial information. Equations (2.1) indicate how the state variables are determined by private-sector behavior given the central bank's instrument settings it, and the beliefs of the central bank (as opposed to those of the private sector) are not obviously relevant. Similar methods to those expounded here can be employed even in the presence of the additional terms, but at the cost of additional algebraic complexity.
where v t , the vector of noise, is iid with mean zero and covariance matrix Σ vv . Central-bank information I t in period t is given by
where δ (0 < δ < 1) is a discount factor (to be introduced below). This incorporates the case when some or all of the predetermined and forward-looking variables are observable by the central bank. The full information I f t in period t, the private-sector information set, is given by 
Certainty equivalence
In the present section, we assume that there is no commitment mechanism, so the central bank acts under discretion. Assume that central bank each period, conditional on the information I t , minimizes the expected discounted current and future values of the intertemporal loss function,
Svensson and Woodford [12, appendix A] show that certainty-equivalence applies for the central bank's optimization when the central bank and the private sector has the same information. The same proof goes through in the present case of asymmetric information. Thus, the equilibrium under discretion will be characterized by the instrument being a linear function of the current estimate of the predetermined variables,
Furthermore, the estimate of the forward-looking variables will fulfill 
Failure of the separation principle
We can show that the forward-looking variables evolve according to a relation of the form
where the matrix G 1 remains to be determined. In the case of symmetric information, [12] shows that the matrix G 1 is given by
and hence depends only on A 1 (A 1 22 is assumed to be invertible). We will see that in the present case of asymmetric information, G 1 is determined in a more complex way. In particular, it is no longer generally independent of the specification of the central bank's partial information.
For a given G 1 , it follows from (2.1), (2.4), (2.8) and (2.11) that the dynamics for X t and Z t follow X t+1 = HX t + JX t|t + u t+1 , (2.13)
where We note that, as in the symmetric-information case, the problem of estimating the predetermined variables has been transformed to a problem without forward-looking variables, with the transition equation (2.13) and the measurement equation (2.14); once again, the only nonstandard feature of this filtering problem is the circularity implied by the appearance of X t|t on the right-hand side of the measurement equation. Thus, as discussed in [12] , with forward-looking variables among the observable variables, there is a simultaneity problem because the forwardlooking variables depend on the current estimate of the predetermined variables and the latter depend on the observables.
Temporarily ignoring the simultaneity problem, the optimal estimate of X t+1 will be given by a Kalman filter updating equation,
where the Kalman gain matrix K remains to be determined. The updating equation can, given (2.14), be written
The Kalman gain matrix is given by
where the matrix P ≡ Cov[X t+1 − X t+1|t ] is the covariance matrix for the prediction errors X t+1 − X t+1|t and satisfies
Thus for given G 1 and hence given H and L, P can be solved from (2.22), either numerically or analytically, depending upon the complexity of the matrices H, L and Σ uu . Then K is given by (2.21).
The simultaneity in (2.19) means that the updating equation is not operational. Solving (2.19) for X t+1|t+1 eliminates the simultaneity and results in
where we have used the fact that by (2.13) the prediction equation will be
Equation (2.23) is an operational recursive updating equation, which avoids the simultaneity problem and uses the current observable variables to update the previous estimate X t|t .
It only remains to determine G 1 . Assuming a solution of the form (2.11), we must havẽ
We would like to express the right-hand side as a function of X t , x t and X t|t . We can then equate this with the second block of (2.1),
(where we have used (2.9), solve for x t as a function of X t and X t|t , and identify G 1 .
We note that, by (2.13) and (2.20), we have
Substituting this into (2.25), we obtaiñ
Equating this with (2.26) and solving for x t , we obtain a solution of the form (2.11), where G 1 must satisfy In the case when the private sector has the same information as the central bank, the terms that are multiplied with the factor
. As a consequence, the terms multiplying that same factor in (2.28) vanish, and (2.28) reduces to (2.12) as in [12] .
Thus, in the asymmetric-information case considered here, where the private-sector has full information and the central bank has partial information, certainty-equivalence still applies for the central bank's optimization problem, in the sense that the implied reaction function and response F to its estimate of the predetermined variables is independent of the variance of the shocks, Σ uu , and the information structure of the economy, D 1 , D 2 and Σ vv . However, the separation principle does not apply in the way that it does in the symmetric-information case.
The estimation is now more complex and, in particular, it is not independent of the central bank's objective and its choice of F . (Note that G 1 by (2.28) depends on G, which depends on F and hence C, C i , W and δ.)
Optimal policy with commitment
Again we assume the model (2.1), in which the private sector has full information, but now suppose instead that the central bank commits itself to an optimal plan for the indefinite future at information set I 0 in period 0. As in the case of symmetric partial information treated in [12] , the optimal commitment can be derived using a Lagrangian approach to what is essentially a planning problem in which the structural equations (2.1) are constraints. In the present informational assumptions, the Lagrangian takes the form
where in each period t, ϕ 1t and ϕ 2t are vectors of Lagrange multipliers conformable to X t and x t respectively. The multipliers ϕ 1,t+1 and ϕ 2,t+1 indicate the value of relaxing the constraints represented by the first and second rows of (2.1) respectively; the term −u t+1 has been suppressed inside the first set of square brackets as it is irrelevant for the first-order conditions derived below.
Because the second row of (2.1) represents a set of equilibrium conditions for the determination of x t as a function of information in I f t (rather than for the determination of x t+1 as a function of later information), the multipliers ϕ 2,t+1 are in fact measurable with respect to (that is, depend only on) the period t information set I f t , whereas the multipliers ϕ 1,t+1 are measurable with respect to I f t+1 . (The notation ϕ 2,t+1 rather than ϕ 2t is nonetheless convenient in writing expressions such as (3.1) below.) The final term on the right-hand side corresponds to the constraint imposed by the vector of initial conditions X 0 .
Certainty equivalence
The Lagrangian can be written more compactly 7 in the form
where
We have added a term −δ −1 ϕ 20 x 0 to the terms inside the square brackets, for the sake of symmetry in notation, but now correspondingly stipulate the initial condition ϕ 20 = 0.
(Note that these Lagrange multipliers do not correspond to any actual constraint upon the planning problem.) This should be interpreted as an initial condition for each possible state in period zero consistent with the information set I 0 , rather than a single initial condition for I 0 .
Differentiation of (3.1) with respect to y t and i t then yields the first-order conditions
where the matrices L jk represent second partial derivatives of the period loss function. Note that equations (2.2) and (2.3) imply that L t is a quadratic function of y t and i t ,
so that the L jk are matrices of constant coefficients, that depend only upon the elements of the matrices C, C i , and W.
Assuming that L ii is of full rank, 8 we can solve (3.3) for i t , obtaining
Substituting (3.5) into (2.1) and (3.2) to eliminate i t , and taking the conditional expectation of both equations with respect to I t , we then obtain a system of equations for the expected evolution of y t and ϕ t , that can be written in the form
Here it is worth noting that U and V are symmetric matrices.
Let us assume furthermore that the square matrix on the left-hand side of (3.6) is of full rank. Then we can invert this matrix, to obtain a system of the form
We then wish to consider solutions to (3.7) that are consistent with given initial values for X t|t and ϕ 2,t|t . We note that the number of variables in (3.7) is 2(n X + n x ), where n X and n x is the dimension of X t and x t , respectively, and that there are n X + n x initial conditions (X t|t and ϕ 2,t|t ). We shall restrict our attention to bounded solutions, by which we mean solutions in which for any t, y t+j|t and ϕ t+j|t satisfy a uniform bound for all j. Such solutions necessarily satisfy the transversality condition for an optimal plan, and since our equations (2.1)-(2.4) will usually represent only a local approximation to the true structural equations and true loss function, unbounded solutions need not correspond at all closely to solutions to the true equations.
As usual (and ignoring non-generic cases), there is a unique bounded solution to (3.7) consistent with the initial conditions if the number of eigenvalues of M inside the unit circle (that is, with modulus less than one) is exactly equal to the number of initial conditions, n X + n x .
The eigenvalues λ of M are the roots of the characteristic equation
Multiplication of the right blocks of this matrix by −λ −1 , then multiplication of the lower blocks
, and finally transposition of the matrix does not change the sign of its determinant.
Thus we may equivalently write . Thus, since
the eigenvalues (that is, at most n X + n x ) are inside the unit circle (that is, with |λ| < 1), so there is no possibility of multiple stationary solutions to (3.7) . If δ is close to 1 (as will often be the case), there are likely to be exactly half inside the unit circle. We shall assume this condition from now on. 9 Then (3.7) has a unique bounded solution in which y t+j|t and ϕ t+j|t can be expressed as linear functions of the initial conditions X t|t and ϕ 2,t|t , for arbitrary j ≥ 0.
Substitution of this solution into (3.5) implies evolution of the instrument according to a relation of the form
where F and Φ are matrices of constant coefficients, and we now introduce the notation Ξ t−1 ≡ ϕ 2t for the sub-vector of Lagrange multipliers that are predetermined state variables under our characterization of the optimal commitment, just as in the symmetric-information case treated in [12] . (We change the time subscript to emphasize that the elements of Ξ t−1 are determined at date t − 1.) Similarly, the conditional expectations of the forward-looking variables evolve according to a relation of the form
10) 9 In the case of an exact linear-quadratic model, as opposed to a mere local approximation to a nonlinear model, this condition is not necessary in order for us to identify the unique relevant solution to (3.7), as the unique solution that does not explode fast enough to violate the transversality condition. But in practice we are not likely to deal with models that we can regard as exact, and instead assume that the optimal plan happens to be stationary. In this case, the eigenvalue condition assumed in the text must hold, as there would otherwise be no stationary solution.
while the conditional expectations of the Lagrange multipliers associated with the forwardlooking variables evolve according to
where G, Γ, S, Σ are further matrices of constant coefficients. Substitution of these solutions into (2.1) then implies that the conditional expectations of the predetermined variables evolve according to at all (and independent of the matrix Σ uu defining the fundamental uncertainty). This is the sense in which the optimal commitment here continues to conform to the principle of certainty equivalence.
The system of equations (3.9)-(3.12) are also exactly the same as those that characterize the optimal commitment in the case of symmetric (though incomplete) information on the part of the central bank and the private sector, as shown in [12] . The only difference is that in the symmetric case, the Lagrange multipliers associated with the forward-looking variables satisfy
, so that equations (3.9)-(3.12) can be written in terms of the multipliers themselves rather than their conditional expectations, while this is not generally true when the central bank has less information. (We show below that in general Ξ t−1 depends on information not possessed by the central bank at date t − 1.)
Failure of the separation principle
In the case of symmetric information, we can also take the second row of (2.1), subtract each term from its expectation conditional upon I t , and obtain a set of n x linear relations between x t − x t|t and X t − X t|t that must hold at all times. (The derivation of these relations depends upon the fact that the E t x t+1 term in the second row of (2.1) is instead replaced by x t+1|t when the private sector has the same incomplete information as the central bank.) These relations can be solved for x t , yielding (when (3.10) is used as well) a solution for x t as a linear function of X t , X t|t , and Ξ t−1 . Substituting this in turn into the first row of (2.1), one is able to solve for the complete dynamics of the state variables (and not merely their expectations conditional upon the central bank's information) and of the Lagrange multipliers given the evolution of the estimates X t|t , with coefficients that are independent of the nature of the partial information.
This is an aspect of the separation principle that can be shown to hold in the case of symmetric incomplete information, just as in the case of full information. However, that derivation (detailed in [13] ) cannot be applied here, given that E t x t+1 must be distinguished from x t+1|t .
However, the second row of (2.1) does imply that
whereŷ t ≡ y t − y t|t . (Here we use the fact that i t must be measurable with respect to I t .)
Similarly, (3.2) implies that
whereφ t ≡ ϕ t − ϕ t|t . Let us write the system (3.14)-(3.15) as
In order to solve (3.16) for the dynamics ofŷ t andφ t , we must specify how the central bank's conditional expectations are updated (for instance, how y t+1|t+1 relates to y t+1|t ). Let us suppose that the Kalman filter for the bank's problem takes the form
whereL
whereK andL are matrices that have yet to be identified. (We show below that the Kalman filter does indeed take this form, and identify these matrices.) Equation (3.17) implies
By adding (E t y t+1 , E t ϕ t+1 ) to both sides and rearranging, we can write the equation as
LetĪ be the submatrix of the identity matrix that selects the elements
Then we can write (3.19) as
where we assume that I −KLĪ is invertible. Substituting (3.20) into (3.16) results iñ
Again, we are interested in bounded solutions of (3.21) consistent with given initial values forX t andΞ t−1 . We assume the appropriate configuration of eigenvalues of the system. There is then a unique bounded solution of the form
where as usual the matricesḠ
can be derived from the eigenvectors of the system (3.21).
Combining (3.10) with (3.22), we find that A complete solution for the dynamics of the state variables also now requires that we solve for the dynamics of the multipliers Ξ t , which are no longer fully characterized by (3.11). Combining (3.11) and (3.22), we find that
, and S and Σ are the matrices appearing in (3.11) . It is the fact thatS 1 is generally non-zero in this derivation that implies that Ξ t is no longer measurable with respect to I t . Unless all elements of X t are part of the central bank's information set at date t + 1, Ξ t will generally not be measurable with respect to I t+1 , either.
It remains to determine the evolution of the estimatesX t|t . We note that in the present case (unlike that of symmetric partial information) it is necessary to derive a Kalman filter for the evolution of the estimates Ξ t−1|t as well as for the estimates X t|t . Substitution of (3.9) and (3.24) into the first row of (2.1), combination with (3.25), and substitution into (2.4) leads to the transition equation forX t ,X t+1 =HX t +JX t|t +ū t+1 , (3.26) and to the measurement equation
H, J, L, M are again defined as in (2.15)-(2.18), and
Note that Ψ ≡ Ψ 1 + Ψ 2 is the same matrix as in (3.12) , so that (3.26) is consistent with (though not implied by) equations (3.11) and (3.12) for the evolution of the conditional expectations.
The system of equations consisting of (3.26) then represents a system of transition equations with a form analogous to (2.13), in which the state vector X t is replaced by the vectorX t that includes the elements of both X t and Ξ t−1 . Equation (3.27) is similarly a measurement equation with a form analogous to (2.14). It follows that the optimal estimates of X t and Ξ t−1 will be given by a Kalman filter analogous to (2.20). We thus obtain updating equations for X t and Ξ t−1 of the form indicated by the corresponding rows of (3.17),
whereK ≡ĪK.
Using (3.26) to form the forecastX t+1|t , (3.29) may be written
For a given Kalman gain matrixK, a complete system of equations for the evolution of the endogenous variables is then given by (3.24), (3.26) and (3.30), which apply in each period t ≥ 0, starting from given initial values for X 0 and X 0|0 , and from the initial values Ξ −1 = Ξ −1|0 = 0.
It remains to determine the Kalman gain matrix in (3.29). Making use of the analogy between equations (3.26)-(3.29) and (2.13), (2.14) and (2.20), we directly find that the Kalman gain matrix is given by the equation These equations are considerably more complicated to solve than in the case of symmetric partial information, treated in Svensson and Woodford [12] . First of all, the matricesK and P are larger (of dimension (n X + n x ) × (n X + n x ) rather than simply n X × n X ). But more importantly, the elements of the matricesH andL that appear in (3.28) do not depend solely upon the elements of A and D, as in the case of symmetric information. For the matrix G 1 appearing in the definitions of H and L is no longer given by (2.12), but instead depends upon the matrices of the system (3.21) and hence on the Kalman gain matrixK (though we show below that it only depends onK). The same is true of the matrices Γ 1 , S 1 and Σ 1 that enter intoH. Thus, one must solve a system of simultaneous equations forP ,K, and the matrices that define the solution to (3.21); a separation principle no longer holds. This simultaneity is the same as we found in section 2, except that now the matrices involved are all of larger dimension.
The definitions of the matrices in (3.21) refer not only toK but also to the other elements of the Kalman gain matrixK. These, however, are easily expressed as functions ofK. Let us decomposeK with obvious notation,K
Then by (3.10) the Kalman gain matrix for the forward-looking variables, x t , is given bỹ
Similarly, the unique bounded solution to (3.7) allows us to write ϕ 1t|t as a matrix timesX t|t , where the matrix is the same as in the case of full information (or certainty). This equation implies that the Kalman gain matrix for the prediction equation for ϕ 1t ,K ϕ1 , will be the same matrix timesK. Thus the only simultaneity that must be dealt with is the dependence of the matrices G 1 , Γ 1 , S 1 and Σ 1 uponK.
Application: Optimal monetary policy with real-time data
As an example of an application of our results, we sketch here the analysis of Aoki [1] and [2] of the way in which optimal monetary policy should make use of the preliminary estimates of current macroeconomic conditions that are available in real time. As Orphanides [8] in particular has stressed, policy must be made on the basis of preliminary estimates that are in fact revised substantially in subsequent months. Aoki models this by assuming that the available measures of current inflation and output are subject to measurement error, while the true values come to be known with a delay. The question that he considers is how the degree of uncertainty about the current state should affect the degree to which policy responds to the available real-time measures. Here we indicate how Aoki's analysis could be cast in terms of our framework.
Aoki assumes that output y t and inflation π t are determined by a model consisting of two structural equations,
which can be interpreted as an intertemporal "IS equation" and "aggregate supply equation"
respectively. Here the short-term nominal interest rate i t is assumed to be the central bank's policy instrument. The dependence of both relations upon expectations regarding future output and inflation introduces the forward-looking elements into the model's structural relation that complicates the central bank's optimal filtering and control problems. 10 Note that the expectations in these relations are conditional upon the full information set of the private sector.
The exogenous disturbances ρ t and y n t are assumed to evolve as first-order autoregressive processes,
3)
where 0 < η, ν < 1 and the disturbances e ρt , e yt are i.i.d. mean-zero normal random variables, with variance s 2 ρ and s 2 y respectively. The central bank is assumed to wish to minimize a discounted loss function (2.7), where the period loss function is of the form
for a certain weight a > 0. This is a standard specification of "flexible inflation targeting" (see Svensson [11] ), and can also be justified as a utility-based welfare criterion given the individual decision problems underlying relations (4.1)-(4.2) (see Woodford [18] ).
Because the "natural rate of output" around which one wishes to stabilize output according to (4.5) is exactly the shift factor in the aggregate supply relation (4.2), the aggregate supply relation itself implies no conflict between the goals of inflation and output-gap stabilization. It is possible in principle to completely stabilize both target variables, since π t = 0 and y t = y n t at all times is consistent with equation (4.2), and also with equation (4.1) as long as the nominal interest rate satisfies
That is, complete stabilization of both target variables is a possible equilibrium, as long as the interest rate i t perfectly tracks the exogenous variation in the Wicksellian "natural rate of interest" r n t (discussed further in Woodford [17] ). Under full information on the part of the central bank, this would represent optimal policy, as this equilibrium achieves the theoretical minimum value of the loss function (zero each period). 11 However, the central bank's real-time information set may not allow it to estimate the current natural rate of interest with complete accuracy. In this case, complete stabilization is not feasible, and the central bank faces a tradeoff between the two goals of greater inflation or greater output-gap stabilization.
Aoki assumes that the central bank's information set when setting i t consists of complete information about all state variables known to the private sector at date t − 1, plus noisy preliminary estimates of current inflation and output. These preliminary estimates are assumed to be given by 8) where the measurement-error terms ε πt and ε yt are i.i.d. mean-zero normal random variables, with variance σ 2 π and σ 2 y respectively. These errors in the central bank's preliminary estimates are assumed to be distributed independently of the "fundamental" disturbances e ρt and e yt . Here the predetermined/exogenous state variables consist of a 2-vector of exogenous disturbances X * t and the non-predetermined endogenous variables consist 11 That is, an optimal policy would bring about an equilibrium in which the nominal interest rate would vary in this way. This does not necessarily mean that the optimal policy is for the central bank to set its instrument according to the function (4.6) of the exogenous disturbances; for while such a policy rule would be consistent with the optimal equilibrium, it would also allow an extremely large class of other rational-expectations equilibria as well, which equilibria are less desirable. Other rules, that specify feedback from inflation and outputgap outcomes as under the "Taylor rule", are equally consistent with the optimal equilibrium and can render equilibrium determinate as well (see Woodford [17] ). There is no uniquely optimal rule of this form, since rules that differ in the way that they specify out-of-equilibrium behavior may imply the same set of equilibria.
of a 2-vector x t , where
and it is possible to write equations (4.1)-(4.2) in a form such thatẼ = I. While it would be possible to write the model's equations in the form (2.1) with X t = X * t , this notation would not allow us to express the central bank's period t observables as a function of X t , x t and measurement error alone, as assumed in (2.4) . In order to directly apply our above expressions for the optimal filtering problem, it is necessary to augment the state vector to include lagged values of the fundamental disturbances, so that
The system (2.1) then becomes a system of six difference equations, including two identities.
Aoki's loss function (4.5) also falls under our framework. This is a loss function of the form Because C i = 0, we must apply the approach described in appendix A rather than the one followed in the text, but we are still able to derive a system of first-order conditions for optimal policy of the form (3.7).
Finally, the assumed information structure falls under the framework set out above, if we let
where Z * t and ε t are the 2-vectors of the observations, [π o t y o t ] , and measurement errors, [ε πt ε yt ] , respectively. Under this specification, the central bank's information set at date t includes the entire history {X * t−j } for j ≥ 1, and so a complete description of the state of the world as of date t − 1, but only the information about date t fundamentals that is contained in the noisy measurements of current inflation and output (the two elements of Z * t ). Aoki assumes, as we do, complete information on the part of the private sector.
Our results in sections 2 and 3 can then be directly applied. Discretionary optimization by the central bank (treated by Aoki in [1] ) results in the interest rate satisfying a relation of the form (2.8). Furthermore, the matrix F in this relation is the same as under full information.
This allows us to write the relation in the simpler form
since the state variables X * t−1 may be omitted from the vector X t in the case of full information. Furthermore, the corresponding relation in the full-information case is given by (4.6), allowing us to identify the elements of the vector f . Optimal policy under discretion is thus characterized by the relation
A Kalman filter can then be used to describe the evolution of the central bank's optimal estimate of the current natural rate of interest.
Under an optimal commitment (treated by Aoki in [2] ), instead, the interest rate satisfies a more complex relation of the form
(This similarly follows from (3.9), given that the elements X * t−1 of the state vector X t are irrelevant in the case of full information, and that Ξ t−1|t = Ξ t−1 under Aoki's information structure.) Once again, the vectors f and φ are the same as in the case of full information.
Since the optimal equilibrium under full information satisfies (4.6), 12 the vector f is the same as in the case of discretionary optimization, and (4.10) may equivalently be written
Note that it would not be correct to argue on the basis of certainty equivalence that since i t = r n t is the optimal commitment under full information, the optimal rule with incomplete information will satisfy i t = r n t|t . The reason that the optimal commitment (4.6) can be written without any feedback from a Lagrange multiplier in the case of full information is not because φ = 0 for this model, but rather because Ξ t−1 = 0 at all times. This is because under full information, complete stabilization of the target variables is feasible, and so there is no gain from relaxing the constraints imposed by the model's structural equations. But one can show (by computing the relevant eigenvectors of the matrix M in (3.7)) that φ = 0, so that the second term on the right-hand side of (4.11) cannot be omitted. Nor is it true that Ξ t−1 is zero most of the time, in the case of imperfect information on the part of the central bank. This is because when information is imperfect, it will generally not be possible for the central bank to adjust its interest-rate instrument (which must depend only upon the central bank's information) so as to perfectly track variations in the natural rate of interest, and so perfect stabilization will be unattainable. In this case, there will generally be non-zero state-contingent Lagrange multipliers associated with perturbations of the constraints implied by the structural equations (4.1)-(4.2).
This does not contradict our certainty-equivalence results above, because these do not imply that the law of motion for the Lagrange multipliers must be the same as in the case of full information. It is true that (3.11) must hold, with the same matrices S and Σ as in the case of full information. In the case of full information, we know that S = 0, since Ξ t will be zero regardless of the realization of the exogenous disturbances X t . Thus (3.11) reduces in Aoki's model to Specifically, Aoki [2] shows that the optimal commitment involves making interest rates higher than the current estimate of the natural rate if the bank now knows that it underestimated the natural rate in the past. The reason is that the private sector is aware of the bank's misperception, and if it understands that the bank will later correct its error, then even when the current short rate is below the natural rate, the private sector's expectation of higher future short rates will dampen the high demand (and hence inflationary pressure) that would otherwise result. Of course, the cost of fulfilling such a commitment later is a short-term interest rate that deviates to a greater extent from the natural rate at that time; but some use of this mechanism can nonetheless improve the bank's overall stabilization objectives. Optimal policy is thus not purely forward-looking, in the sense discussed in Woodford [16] . Indeed, the response of the bank's interest-rate instrument to fluctuations in the natural rate of interest will be more inertial than is the natural rate itself, just as in the analysis of Woodford [15] . In the case of a positive innovation in the natural rate, the average immediate increase in the nominal interest rate will be smaller, because of the bank's inability to identify the increase immediately given its imperfect observation of current conditions. At the same time, the increase in interest rates will last longer, because in later periods the central bank will respond to its initial underestimate of the natural rate by keeping interest rates higher than the natural rate at those later times.
Interestingly, Aoki obtains these results in the case of asymmetric information without any need for the assumption of an interest-rate stabilization objective in the central bank's loss function, relied upon in the full-information analysis of Woodford [15] .
A Appendix: The case of a loss function independent of the instruments
Here we consider the extension of our results to the special case in which C i = 0, so that the policymaker's objective function is independent of the path of the instruments i t . In this case,
L ii = 0, so that the matrix is necessarily not invertible, as assumed in the text. In this case, we cannot solve (3.3) for i t . However, in this case we also must have L iy = 0; hence there is no need to solve (3.3) in order to eliminate i t from (3.2), as the equation is already in the desired form. We can simply take the conditional expectation of (3.2) with respect to I t and obtain
which is of the same form as the upper half of the system of equations (3.6). The sticking point is that we are unable to eliminate i t from (2.1), as is also necessary in order to derive the system (3.6) in the text.
It is nonetheless possible to derive a system of difference equations of the same general form.
We note that in the present case, (3.3) reduces to
This is a set of restrictions of the same form as those in the system (3.6), and independent of (3.2). Let us suppose that B is of full rank; 13 then (A.2) is a system of n i linearly independent restrictions, where n i is the number of instruments. Let g be an (n X + n x ) × (n X + n x − n i ) matrix, the columns of which all linearly independent of one another, and orthogonal to each of the columns of B (so that g B = 0). Then premultiplying (2.1) by g and taking the conditional expectation with respect to I t , we obtain g Ĩ y t+1|t = g Ay t|t .
(A.3)
This provides an additional n X + n x − n i linearly independent restrictions, and equations (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) jointly comprise a system of the form (3.6). In the generic case, the matrix on the left-hand side will be invertible as assumed in the text, and one will obtain a system of the form (3.7).
